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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently dealt another blow
to the moribund doctrine of sovereign immunity by unexpectedly
denying the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (PTC) immunity
from suit. Through its holding in Specter v. Commonwealth' the
court has introduced another element in the determination of the
immunity enjoyed by separate bodies existing within the state govern-
ment. This new element is financial independence from the Com-
monwealth. The weight to be given it is the subject of this note.
Specter arose from a personal injury action based on the alleged
negligence of a PTC employee.2 Plaintiffs sought to bring suit
against both the PTC and the Commonwealth. While allowing the
action to proceed against the PTC, the supreme court refused to
abrogate the immunity of the sovereign and, therefore, disallowed suit
against the Commonwealth.3 Justice Pomeroy reiterated the court's
position that article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution
precludes suit against the Commonwealth absent explicit legislative
authorization and that the onus for such change rests exclusively with
the legislature.4
As we said in Brown v. Commonwealth... '[w]hether the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity should be modified is a legislative
question. We could not base a contrary holding upon our im-
patience with the Legislature's failure to act as speedily and
comprehensively as we believe it should.' We remain of this
opinion .... 5
Ostensibly this decision merely reaffirms the principles govern-
ing inquiries into governmental and sovereign immunity explicated in
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education' and Brown v.
1. - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 481 (1975).
2. The Specters alleged that a commission employee driving a PTC vehicle
negligently made an illegal U-turn without warning and caused a collision with the
Specters' vehicle, resulting in plaintiffs' personal injuries.
3. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 482.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). In this case a Philadelphia school stu-
dent was allowed to bring an action in negligence for personal injuries against the
school board. In so holding the supreme court abolished the doctrine of immunity
for governmental units in tort actions.
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Commonwealth.' The approach taken in determining the status of
the PTC, however, is a significant departure from Ayala.
In Ayala the court extinguished the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions that had served as the standard8 for
determining whether a local governmental unit enjoyed immunity.
The Ayala court announced that as governmental immunity was a
judicial creation and not mandated by the constitution, ° the supreme
court was competent to annul the doctrine.:" Yet, neither Ayala nor
Brown established criteria for judging whether an entity involved in
state functions shared the sovereign's immunity.' 2  Prior to Ayala
governmental immunity had been held to encompass only local gov-
ernmental entities, such as counties,' 3 townships,' 4 and school dis-
tricts.15 Bodies more closely identified with the Commonwealth
existed in a twilight zone-on the periphery of the sovereign by
definition, yet sufficiently autonomous because of self-regulatory
structure to warrant challange.' 6
This uncertainty was manifested in a recent superior court deci-
sion, Greer v. Metropolitan Hospital.7 In Greer Judge Jacobs exam-
7. 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973). This tort action alleged that the neg-
ligence of a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard, an agent of the Common-
wealth, resulted in injuries to plaintiff. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's
disallowance of the suit because of the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.
8. In Morris v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737
(1958), the supreme court disallowed immunity to school districts engaged in revenue
raising not required by statute and other proprietary functions.
9. See, e.g., Comment, Sovereign Immunity and Governmental Immunity-
Protecting the Government or the Governed?, 35 U. PI-. L. REV. 355 (1973); Com-
ment, Judicial Abrogation o1 Governmental and Sovereign Immunity: A National
Trend with a Pennsylvania Perspective, 78 DIcK. L. REV. 365 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Pennsylvania Perspective].
10. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 states, "[Sluits may be brought against the Com-
monwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may
by law direct."
11. 453 Pa. at 600, 305 A.2d at 885. In Pennsylvania Perspective the author
discussed whether governmental immunity also became a question for the legislature
after the initial judicial ruling that established the immunity. Pennsylvania Perspec-
tive, supra note 9, at 386.
12. Greer v. Metropolitan Hosp., 235 Pa. Super. 266, 341 A.2d 520 (1975).
13. E.g., Laughner v. Allegheny County, 436 Pa. 572, 261 A.2d 607 (1970).
14. E.g., Boorse v. Springfield Tp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954).
15. E.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877
(1973).
16. See, e.g., Specter v. Commonwealth, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 481, 482-83
(1975).
17. 235 Pa. Super. 266, 341 A.2d 520 (1975). Plaintiff-appellant received per-
sonal injuries from the collapse of a fire escape on property owned by a city rede-
velopment authority. The authority asserted a defense based on sovereign immunity,
which the trial court found persuasive.
ined city redevelopment authorities to determine the extent to which
they enjoyed immunity. His opinion correctly observed that "[n]one
of the opinions in Brown or Ayala specifically states which units of
government fall within the 'governmental immunity' doctrine as op-
posed to 'sovereign immunity.' ,,1s The superior court focused on the
functional nature and operation of the redevelopment authorities,
rather than statutory terminology and appellation that seemed to
cloak the authorities in sovereign immunity. The functional separa-
tion of these authorities from the Commonwealth and, conversely,
their close relationship to local governing bodies dictated that they be
denied immunity. 19
Ironically, less than two weeks before the Specter decision was
announced, the superior court in Greer compared the spurious "nomi-
nal" relationship that existed between the redevelopment authorities
and the Commonwealth to the functional (and then valid)20 relation-
ship between the PTC and the Commonwealth. The Greer court
cited Rader v. PTC2" as the case that definitively analyzed the PTC's
relation to the Commonwealth. In Rader the PTC was found to be
"in many respects the alter ego of the Commonwealth."22  The facts
that demonstrated this close union were "the direct control and
supervision of the Turnpike ' 23 by the Commonwealth, the preroga-
tive of the Department of Highways to approve all contracts involving
the turnpike, the continuous supervision of all construction by the
Department, and the categorization of turnpike employees as Com-
monwealth employees.24 For these same reasons the Greer court
recognized that the General State Authority (GSA) was similarly
immune .
25
The Greer decision was a logical extension of the theme devel-
oped in Ayala. It supported a dual proposition: that governmental
immunity was characteristic only of local governmental bodies and
18. 235 Pa. Super. at 277, 341 A.2d at 525.
19. Id. at 275, 341 A.2d at 523. These authorities only become operative by
the affirmative action of local governing bodies; the membership of the authority is
appointed by local officials; and all plans and actions of the authorities are subject
to the supervision and approval of local bodies. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1704(a),
1705, 1710(h) (1964).
20. 235 Pa. Super. at 278, 341 A.2d at 526, citing Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609,
182 A.2d 199 (1962), which held the PTC immune from suit in tort.
21. 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962).
22. Id. at 617, 182 A.2d at 203.
23. Greer v. Metropolitan Hosp., 235 Pa. Super. 266, 278, 341 A.2d 520, 526
(1975), citing Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609, 618-20, 182 A.2d 199, 203-04 (1962).
24. 235 Pa., Super. at 278, 341 A.2d at 526, citing Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609,
618-20, 182 A.2d 199, 203-04 (1962). In 1937 the Department of Highways was
replaced by the Department of Transportation. The Turnpike Commission Act and
the Specter opinion, however, refer to the former department. See Specter v. Com-
monwealth, - Pa. -, - n.5, 341 A.2d 481, 484 n.5 (1975).
25. 235 Pa. Super. at 279, 341 A.2d at 526.
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that the PTC and similarly structured bodies26 were protected by the
sovereign's immunity. The supreme court decision in Specter refuted
both elements of this proposition.
II. Specter Examined
Justice Pomeroy, early in the Specter decision, posited the fol-
lowing principle as governing the question of immunity:
[W]hether any government entity is amenable to suit depends
upon whether it is or is not part of the 'Commonwealth' as that
term is used in Article I, Section 11, of the Constitution, which
establishes the immunity of the Commonwealth.
27
In determining whether the PTC was a part of the Commonwealth,
the court carefully analyzed the legislative acts creating the Commis-
sion and several judicial decisions that treated the PTC's status.
28
The court embarked upon its analysis of the Pennsylvania Turn-
pike Commission Act 29 by noting statutory appellations that demon-
strated the close relationship between the PTC and the Common-
wealth envisioned by the general assembly.Y0 Section 4 describes
the Commission as an "instrumentality of the Commonwealth."' 31 The
Act also refers to the PTC's exercise of its powers as "an essential
governmental function."3 2  Despite these initial observations the su-
preme court found that the powers with which the PTC had been
vested set it apart from the Commonwealth. Directly contradicting
the finding of the Rader court, Justice Pomeroy's opinion pointed to
the independent and extensive power structure of the PTC as incon-
sistent with its characterization as an alter ego of the Common-
wealth.3" The powers recognized as significant included the ability
26. E.g., the General State Authority.
27. Specter v. Commonwealth, - Pa. , ,341 A.2d 481, 483 (1975).
28. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 483-90.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 652a-652q (1961).
30. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 483-84.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652d (Supp. 1975).
32. Id.
33. The court recognized the following powers as significant:
To sue and be sued; plead and be impleaded; contract and be contracted
with, and have an official seal.
To not be required to pay any taxes . . . on any property . . . and bonds
or other securities and obligation issued by the Commission . . . shall at
all times be free from taxation.
To make necessary rules and regulations for its own government.
To acquire, own, use, hire, lease, operate and dispose of personal property.
To make and enter into all contracts and agreements necessary or incidental
to the performance of its duties and the execution of its powers.
To employ engineering, traffic, architectural, and construction experts and
to sue and be sued, freedom from state and local taxation, self-
regulation, the power to own property, enter contracts, and hire
employees, the power of eminent domain, and fiscal autonomy
through the issuance of bonds. As in Rader, the Specter court ac-
knowledged that the Commission in its exercise of these powers acts
largely under the supervision of the Department of Highways. 4 Nev-
ertheless, the court chose to focus on the last power, the ability to issue
bonds and raise revenue, in developing an analysis that led to the
conclusion that the PTC is distinct from the Commonwealth. Jus-
tice Pomeroy regarded this power and its supporting provisions as
providing meticulously for the PTC's financial independence. His
opinion stressed the section of the Act declaring
[t]hat turnpike revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this
act shall not be deemed to be a debt of the Commonwealth or
pledge of the faith and credit of the Commonwealth, but such
bonds shall be payable exclusively from the funds herein provided
therefor from tolls. . . . The issuance of turnpike revenue
bonds under the provisions of this act shall not, directly or
indirectly or contingently, obligate the Commonwealth to buy
or to pledge any form taxation whatever therefor, or to make
any appropriation for their payment.
3 5
On the other hand, the close relationship between the PTC and
the Commonwealth"6 presented an impediment not easily overcome
by a novel statutory analysis. The court found a case analysis neces-
sary to a clarification of the PTC's status. The court observed that be-
fore 1962 the supreme court had never decided whether the PTC
was imbued with sovereign immunity. 7 Then, in Rader the PTC was
declared to be the Commonwealth's alter ego and, thus, the recipient
of its immunity. Before that decision two irreconcilable views had
evolved. The majority of common pleas courts that considered the
question had held the PTC immune from suit.3 8 This view received
inspectors and attorneys, and such other employees as may be necessary in
its judgment, and fix their compensation.
To acquire by condemnation . . . any lands, easements and other property
deemed necessary or convenient for the construction or -the efficient oper-
ation of the turnpike.
To provide for the issuance of turnpike revenue bonds of the Common-
wealth for the purpose of paying the cost of the turnpike.
- Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 485, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 652d, 652f (Supp.
1975); id. §§ 652h, 652k (1961).
34. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 485; Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609, 619, 182 A.2d
199, 204 (1962); see note 24 supra.
35. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 484, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652b
(1961).
36. Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609, 617, 182 A.'2d 199, 203 (1962); Greer v. Met-
ropolitan Hosp., 235 Pa. Super. 266, 278, 341 A.2d 520, 526 (1975).
37. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 487-89.
38. Super v. PTC, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 372 (C.P. Dauph. 1959); DiRenzo v.
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 723 (C.P. Phila. 1957); Caputo




tangential support from two supreme court decisions in which rather
vague language likened the Commission to the Commonwealth.39
An opposite view had been reached by the two earliest courts of
common pleas to confront the issue.40  More significantly, the feder-
al district courts4 had been nearly unanimous in denying immunity
to the Commission because it "was a distinct entity separate and apart
from the Commonwealth."42  These holdings were reinforced by the
Third Circuit in 1960 when that court inferred from a prior Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania decision that the law of the Commonwealth
did not support the PTC's immunity.
43
In the light of this history, the precedent established by Rader v.
PTC 4 could be overcome. Justice Pomeroy perceived Rader as a
poorly reasoned decision based on weak authority. 45 He gave great
weight to the majority of earlier decisions that had addressed the issue
of immunity. The most incisive had "taken the view that the Com-
mission [was] separate and apart from the Commonwealth.1 46 This
conclusion justified the Specter court's decision to focus on the statu-
tory framework that established the PTC's fiscal autonomy and led it
to declare the Commission no longer immune from suit under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court pointed out, however,
that a distinction must still be drawn between governmental bodies
like the PTC and departments of the Commonwealth. Had the
turnpike been constructed and operated under the auspices of the
Department of Transportation, "the State's immunity from suit would
encompass actions arising in connection with the Turnpike."47
39. Pennsylvania Tpk. Condem. Case, 347 Pa. 643, 32 A.2d 910 (1943),
which held that the Commission as a state agency was not obligated to compensate
another state agency for land titled in the name of the Commonwealth because basic
ownership of the land was not affected by condemnation; PTC v. Smith, 350 Pa. 355,
39 A.2d 139 (1944), which held that the Commission, like the Commonwealth, was
not liable for interest on an arbitration award.
40. Brenner v. PTC, 45 Pa. D. & C. 124 (C.P. Cumb. 1942), which held that
the PTC was not an integral part of the Commonwealth and consequently was liable
for interest and costs in eminent domain proceedings; PTC v. Baldwin Bros., 44 Pa.
D. & C. 462 (C.P. Allegh. 1942), which held that statutory requirements concerning
bonds given to the Commonwealth did not encompass bonds given to the Commission
because the Commission and the Commonwealth were not synonomous.
41. Linger v. PTC, 158 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Eastern Motor Express
v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Lowes v. PTC, 125 F. Supp. 681
(M.D. Pa. 1954); Hunkin-Conkey Constr. Co. v. PTC, 34 F. Supp. 26 (M.D. Pa.
1940).
42. Specter v. Commonwealth, - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 481, 487 (1975).
43. Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960).
44. 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962).
45. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 489-90.
46. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 490.
47. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 490-91.
By recognizing fiscal autonomy as a determinative element in
considering the status of governmental bodies related to the Com-
monwealth, the supreme court has clarified the Ayala standard48 and
limited the extent of sovereign immunity relative to such bodies.
Nevertheless, Specter leaves important questions unanswered. Is
financial independence essential to the distinction between agencies
like the PTC and departments of the Commonwealth? Can other
criteria illustrate an entity's separation from the Commonwealth?
These questions are significant because there are other governmental
bodies inherently similar to the PTC, but without the ability to issue
bonds. 9 Some of these bodies rely upon the bonds and the full faith
and credit of the Commonwealth. 0  To what area are these entities
to be relegated? Are they part of the Commonwealth despite the
tenor of Ayala and Specter or are they of a genre implicitly encom-
passed by Specter? Before the latter assessment can be accepted, the
Specter test of financial independence must be viewed as merely one
of several indicators of nonimmune status.
III. Beyond Specter
Even if future courts construe Specter narrowly, any state agency
vested with powers similar to those enumerated by the Specter
court, 51 particularly the power to issue bonds, should be deemed
amenable to suit. For example, the Pennsylvania Housing Finance
Agency (PHFA) 2 is indistinguishable from the PTC in its statutorily
vested powers and internal structure.53 Its enumerated powers are
48. Although the supreme court abolished governmental immunity in Ayala,
the court neglected to provide any criteria for determining under Brown which bodies
were "governmental" and consequently without immunity and which were part of the
Commonwealth and immune. Clearly departments existing directly under the Com-
monwealth and intimately involved in state government, policy making, and executive
action are protected, but a multitude of other agencies, closely related to the Com-
monwealth but enjoying varying degrees of independence, are not clearly govern-
mental bodies nor are they clearly "the sovereign."
49. See notes 61, 78 and accompanying text infra.
50. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
51. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1680.101-.603a (Supp. 1975).
53. The PHFA has the following powers and immunities:
To be a party litigant in any court having jurisdiction according to law in
any form of action whatsoever.
To adopt, use, and alter at will a corporate seal.
[T]he notes and bonds of the agency, issued pursuant to this act and the
income therefrom, the income and revenues of the agency, and the agency
and its property shall at all times be free from taxation or assessment of
every kind and nature . ...
To make and alter by-laws for the management and regulation of its affairs
and to make and from time to time amend and repeal rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the business of the agency.
To acquire, hold and dispose of real property, or any interest therein, to
be used by the agency for the purpose of its offices and operations.




identical to those the Specter court found indicative of the PTC's
autonomy. Moreover, they appear in a statutory framework that, like
the PTC's, recognizes the PHFA as a "body corporate and politic"54
performing "an essential governmental function"55 "through cooper-
ation with and assistance to the Pennsylvania Department of Com-
munity Affairs."5 Finally, "[b]onds and notes issued under the pro-
visions of [the PHFA] act shall not be deemed to constitute a debt of
the Commonwealth . . . or a pledge of the faith and credit of the
Commonwealth .... ,,57 In light of Specter this last element is
determinative of the PHFA's status as an independent governmental
agency ineligible for the immunity of the sovereign.5"
The most litigation-prone state agencies, however, are not statu-
torily identical to the PTC. Little significance will attach to this most
recent pronouncement of the supreme court on sovereign immunity
unless at least some of the agencies can be classified with the PTC.
Judge Jacobs in Greer v. Metropolitan Hospital59 identified three
prominent state bodies that enjoy a functional rather than nominal re-
lationship to the Commonwealth and, therefore, are apparently
cloaked with sovereign immunity. These are the PTC, the General
State Authority, and the Delaware River Port Authority. Addition-
ally, the Liquor Control Board can properly be included in this liti-
gious group.60 A reasonable interpretation of the Specter decision
indicates that some of these agencies should also be denied the pro-
tection of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
[To e]mploy an executive director and such other officers, agents, em-
ployes, professional and business advisors as may from time to time be nec-
essary in its judgment and to fix their compensation.
In accordance with the provisions of this act to make commitments to pur-
chase and to purchase, service and sell mortgages, and to make loans di-
rectly upon the security of mortgages.
The agency shall have the power and is hereby authorized from time to time
to issue its negotiable bonds . . . and notes in such principal amount as,
in the opinion of the agency, shall be necessary to provide sufficient funds
for achieving its corporate purposes ....
Id. §§ 1680.205, 1680.501, 1680.506.
54. Id. § 1680.102(7).
55. Id. § 1680.506a.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 1680.502a.
58. This conclusion is reinforced by the comprehensive analysis of the PHFA
conducted by the supreme court in Johnson v. PHFA, 453 Pa. 329, 346, 309 A.2d
528, 536 (1973), in which the constitutionality of the law creating that body was
examined. This case is of further interest because of its extensive reliance on the
reasoning of Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937); see note 64 infra.
59. 235 Pa. Super. 266, 341 A.2d 520 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d
849 (1973); Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A.2d 444 (1944).
A. The General State Authority
No agency has been more often associated with the PTC in
judicial analysis of governmental bodies than the General State Au-
thority (GSA). 6 Both agencies were established during the Great
Depression 2 to obtain federal funds for major construction projects.
At that time the Commonwealth was prohibited by the Pennsylvania
constitution from incurring long-term debt.63  To circumvent this
restriction, governmental entities, such as the PTC and GSA,64 that
functioned apart from the Commonwealth while still performing
essential state tasks were created. Paramount among the broad
powers granted these agencies6" was the power to incur long-term
debt without vicariously pledging the credit of the Commonwealth.
The statutes creating the PTC and GSA contained explicit disclaim-
ers: the liabilities of the agencies were not to be construed as
encumbrances on the Commonwealth. 
6
Each of the powers in the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission
Act selected as significant by Justice Pomeroy in the Specter decision
had an exact parallel in the General State Authority Act of 1937.67
61. Because these novel bodies generated litigation at a time when judicial prec-
edents involving state agencies were sparse, the courts recognized a similarity between
the PTC and GSA to allow invocation of decisions involving the other body that ad-
dressed similar issues. Thus, one early decision reasoned,
It is apparent, therefore, that the legislature created a corporation or entity
which is entirely separate and apart from the Commonwealth and not an
integral part of it. In its general features the Turnpike Commission is sim-
ilar to the General State Authority. It was held in Kelley v. Earle, that
bonds issued by the General State Authority are not debts of the State, as
defined in the constitutional provisions limiting the indebtedness of the State.
If this is so, the General State Authority is not an integral part of the Com-
monwealth, and, by the same reasoning, the Turnpike Commission cannot
contend that it is an integral part of the Commonwealth.
Brenner v. PTC, 45 Pa. D. & C. 124, 127 (C.P. Cumb. 1942) (citation omitted).
Cases that have compared the GSA and PTC include Roney v. GSA, 413 Pa. 218,
196 A.2d 349 (1964); Armour Rentals, Inc. v. GSA, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 517,
287 A.2d 862 (1972); Marianelli v. GSA, 57 Dauph. 194 (Pa. C.P. 1945);
House v. PTC, 45 Pa. D. & C. 677 (C.P. Dauph. 1942).
Legislation has been enacted that will abolish the GSA when all outstanding
bonds issued by that body have been redeemed. Act of July 22, 1975, P.L. -, No. 45,
§ 23(a). The Authority will remain a potential party, however, to any contract or
tort actions arising from GSA projects unless and until a statute of limitations bars
further suits.
62. See Marianelli v. GSA, 57 Dauph. 194 (Pa. C.P. 1945).
63. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1874) (repealed 1969).
64. In Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937), the supreme court
definitively analyzed the constitutionality of these bodies in the context of the needs
and motivating forces for such legislation.
65. See note 33 and accompanying text supra for the powers of the PTC; note
67 and accompanying text infra for those of the GSA.
66. The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. .36, §
652b (1961); the General State Authority Act, id. tit. 71, § 1707.4 (2d proviso)
(1962).
67. The General State Authority Act provided these powers:




Most importantly, the Act provided the GSA with authority "[tio
borrow money, make and issue negotiable notes, bonds, and other
evidence of indebtedness .. . ."Is The GSA retained that power
until 1969 when the necessity of using the agency as a financial
strawman ended. An amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution
allowed the Commonwealth to incur large, long-term debts within
carefully delineated parameters.69 The Capital Facilities Debt Ena-
bling Act7 0 provided for the direct issuance of bonds by the Com-
monwealth and repealed the bond-issuing powers of the GSA. 7'
Although the GSA's lack of bond-issuing power separates it
structurally from the PTC, this difference is not dispositive of the
To adopt, use, and alter at will a corporate seal.
To make contracts of every name and nature, and execute all instruments
necessary or convenient for the carrying on of its business.
[Te acquire, purchase, hold, and use any property, real, personal or mixed,
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein .. .at any time acquired by
the Authority ....
To make by-laws for the management and regulation of its affairs.
mo appoint officers, agents, employees, and servants; to prescribe their
duties and to fix their compensation.
To borrow money, make and issue negotiable notes, bonds, and other evi-
dences of indebtedness ....
mo have the power of eminent domain.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.4(b)-(d), (f)-(g), (i), (1) (1962 & Supp. 1975).
The power to issue bonds and notes was repealed by the Capital Facilities Debt En-
abling Act, Act of July 24, 1969, P.L. 183, No. 75, § 5.
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.4i (1962) (repealed 1969).
69. No debt shall be incurred by or on behalf of the Commonwealth ex-
cept by law and in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Debt may be incurred without the approval of the electors for capital proj-
ects specifically itemized in a capital budget if such debt will not cause the
amount of all net debt outstanding to exceed one and three-quarters times
the average of the annual tax revenues deposited in the previous five fiscal
years as certified by the Auditor General. For the purposes of this subsec-
tion, debt outstanding shall not include debt incurred under clauses (1) and
(2) (i), or debt incurred under clause (2) (ii) if the original debt would not
be so considered, or debt incurred under subsection (3) unless the General
Assembly shall so provide in the law authorizing such debt.
As used in this section, debt shall mean the issued and outstanding obliga-
tions of the Commonwealth and shall include obligations of its agencies or
authorities to the extent they are to be repaid from lease rentals or other
charges payable directly or indirectly from revenues of the Commonwealth.
Debts shall not include either (1) that portion of the obligations to be re-
paid from charges made to the public for the use of the capital projects fi-
nanced, as determined by the Auditor General, or (2) obligations to be re-
paid from lease rentals or other charges payable by a school district or other
local taxing authority, or (3) obligations to be repaid by agencies or au-
thorities created for the joint benefit of the Commonwealth and one or
more other State governments.
PA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 7(a) (preamble), 7(a)(4), 7(c).
70. Act of July 24, 1969, P.L. 183, No. 75, § 5.
71. State Senator Kline characterized the Act as "the legislation which is re-
quired to control the borrowing of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in accordance
with the provisions of our new Constitution." S. JouR. Vol. 1, July 15, 1969, at 525.
625
GSA's fiscal status. Many other provisions in the General State
Authority Act indicate the GSA's financial independence from the
Commonwealth. Without the power to incur debt through bond
issuance, some of these provisions are superfluous; nevertheless the
existing statutory scheme mandating the routine functioning of the
GSA clearly demonstrates a continuing form of financial autonomy.
The GSA was created to construct, improve, equip, furnish, maintain,
and operate "State institutions of every kind."' 2  To accomplish this,
several affirmative powers were provided.73 In addition, the Act
contains express prohibitions against the Authority's obligating the
Commonwealth for its debts or pledging the credit or taxing power of
the Commonwealth or its subdivisions. 4 Thus, while the GSA's
independent ability to finance construction and furnishing of state
institutions was removed by the Capital Facilities Debt Enabling Act,
maintenance and operation of GSA projects and facilities are still
financed and controlled separately under the clear proscription
against incurring the indebtedness of the Commonwealth.7 1 More-
over, recent amendments to the GSA Act indicate that unless so
designated the Authority does not act as an agent of the Common-
wealth.7 6
Admittedly a distinction exists between the fiscal powers of the
GSA and those of the PTC. In Specter Justice Pomeroy emphasized
the ability to issue bonds as evidencing the PTC's consummate finan-
cial autonomy. Nevertheless, other aspects of the GSA's fiscal inde-
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.4 (Ist ) (1962 & Supp. 1975).
73. These powers include the following:
To acquire, purchase, hold and use any property . . . to lease [that prop-
erty] . . . to the Commonwealth . ..or political subdivision; to convey
[that property] to the Commonwealth ....
To fix . . .and collect .. . charges for the use of the facilities . . . for
the purpose of payment of the expenses of the Authority ...
To make contracts of every name and nature, and to execute all instruments
necessary or convenient for the carrying on of its business.
Without limitation of the foregoing, to borrow money and accept grants
from, and to enter into contracts, leases or other transactions with, any Fed-
eral agency.
To pledge, hypothecate, or otherwise encumber all or any of the revenues
or receipts of the Authority as security for all or any of the obligations of
the Authority.
Id. § 1707.4(d), (h), (j)-(k), (m).
74. [T]he Authority shall have no power at any time or in any manner
to pledge the credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth or any of its
cities, counties, school districts, or other political subdivisions, nor shall any
of its obligations or debts be deemed obligations of the Commonwealth
.... nor shall the Commonwealth ... be liable for the payment of princi-
pal of, or interest on, such obligations.
Id. § 1707.4 (2d proviso) (1962).
75. Id.
76. The Authority shall also have power to act as agent for the Com-
monwealth, when requested by the Governor, in the acquisition . . . of any




pendence, like its financial autonomy in the routine operation of its
projects and properties, must be considered if Specter is to have
significance. The judicial tradition that has recognized the great
similarity of the PTC and GSA77 leads inexorably to nonimmune
status for the latter.
B. The Delaware River Port Authority
The Delaware River Port Authority (Port Authority) is organ-
ized as a joint commission under the supervision of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey. 78 The Authority
is the result of a 1931 agreement to allow construction and mainte-
nance of facilities between the two states. In 1962, shortly after the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pronounced the immune status of the
PTC in Rader,79 the court considered the right of an individual to
bring an action against the Port Authority for damages allegedly
caused by construction of the Walt Whitman Bridge. 0 In Anderson
Appeal"l the court announced that the Port Authority was "a vital
arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania carrying on an essential
governmental function" 2 and "to all intents and purposes synonom-
ous with the Commonwealth."' Although this description argues
strongly for a Rader-like result, 4 the Specter decision requires pene-
tration beyond statutory and judicial appellation 5 into the functional
nature and structure of the Port Authority.
The Port Authority, created in 1951, was given powers86 nearly
identical to those noted by Justice Pomeroy in Specter."7 Further-
more, among the Port Authority's powers is the ability to issue bonds
which any proceeds of any bonds issued by the Authority have been or may
hereafter be expended.
It shall not be necessary for the Authority to lease to the Common-
wealth any such projects in which it has so acted as agent nor to hold title
to such projects or properties.
Id. § 1707.4(b) (Supp. 1975).
77. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
78. Delaware River Port Authority Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3503, art.
I (Supp. 1975).
79. Rader v. PTC, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962).
80. Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 184, 182 A.2d at 517.
83. Id. at 182, 182 A.2d at 518.
84. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3503, art. IV, (b)-(j), (o) (1961).
87. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
to raise revenue"' without obligating the Commonwealth. 9 In An-
derson Justice Cohen acknowledged that the Port Authority was
established to circumvent the same constitutional provision that pre-
cipitated the formation of the PTC and GSA.
Both [Port] Authority and the Turnpike Commission, as
well as many of the other state agencies, were cast in their
present form to provide a facility to finance the various projects
entrusted to their care without running into the financial restric-
tions on the state debt limit imposed by Art. IX, § 4 of the
Constitution of 1874. It is reasonable to conclude that absent
the constitutional restriction the functions of these authorities
and commissions would -be carried out by the executive branches
of the government. 90
If Anderson is the definitive analysis of the Port Authority,9' the
quotation above argues persuasively for abrogation of that body's
immunity. In holding the Port Authority immune, Justice Cohen
declared that "the turnpike cases are relevant in a discussion of the
instant situation."92 This relevance was based expressly on the statu-
tory similarity of the two bodies and mandated the same holding that
had been reached earlier in Rader.93 Furthermore, in its conclusion
the court stated that "[w]ith the exception of its borrowing capacity,
[the] Authority simulates the Commonwealth."9 4  That capacity is
exactly the element the Specter court found demonstrative of the
PTC's separate identity from the Commonwealth. Thus, the Port
Authority must be viewed as equally vulnerable to suit.
C. The Liquor Control Board
As recently as 1973 in Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board95 the supreme court granted the LCB immunity from suit. In
that decision Justice O'Brien drew a distinction between governmen-
tal and proprietary functions that the court felt had been implicit in
88. The Port Authority is authorized to issue bonds. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 3503, art. IV, (j) (1961).
89. Notwithstanding any provision of this agreement, the commission shall
have no power to pledge the credit of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, or the credit of the State of New Jersey, or the credit of any county,
city, borough, village, township or other municipality of said Common-
wealth or of said State, or to create any debt of said Commonwealth or
of said State or of such municipality.
Id. art. VII.
90. 408 Pa. at 188, 182 A.2d at 518.
91. Thomas v. Baird, 433 Pa. 482, 252 A.2d 653 (1969), cites Anderson as
the decision that established the right of the Port Authority to immunity coextensive
with the Commonwealth. This case further recognized that the Rader rationale had
been applied to other similarly structured entities (e.g., the GSA) to arrive at the
same conclusion.
92. 408 Pa. at 186, 182 A.2d at 517-18.
93. Id. at 187, 182 A.2d at 518.
94. Id. at 188, 182 A.2d at 519.
95. 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
Notes
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prior applications of the doctrine." The significance of Biello has
been greatly undermined by Specter, however, because of the latter's
rejection of the governmental-proprietary distinction for most pur-
poses. 97
As noted earlier, Ayala and Brown support the proposition that
only the sovereign is immune from suit. 98 Lesser governmental
bodies are liable for their wrongs. The Specter holding suggests a
new standard for defining what state agencies are inextricably identi-
fied with the sovereign and which are separate governmental entities.
Whether an agency carries on a governmental or proprietary function
is irrelevant if an initial examination reveals the agency as separate
and distinct from the Commonwealth.99 Therefore, a decision on the
LCB's status vis-a-vis the Commonwealth must be reached before the
question of function, although resolved in Biello, can arise.
The statutory framework of the LCB is significantly different
from the PTC's. Article II of the Liquor Code 00 creates a body with
comprehensive control of the handling of liquor in the Common-
wealth. Because the Act is "deemed an exercise of the police power
of the Commonwealth," 10 1 the Board is authorized to enact regula-
tions with the force of law concerning the sale and distribution of
liquor in Pennsylvania. 102  The concept of police power adds an
important and distinct dimension to the LCB's authority and opera-
tion. This dimension militates against characterization of the Board
as an entity separate from the source of police power, the Common-
wealth. Moreover, the LCB's fiscal situation reveals it as dependent
on and synonomous with the Commonwealth. All revenues from
LCB activities are paid into the state treasury through the Depart-
ment of Revenue.'03 Thereafter the LCB may draw upon that fund
to perform its assigned functions. Because of the Commonwealth's
ability to provide unsecured advances to the LCB, 0 4 the Board's
96. Id. at 184, 301 A.2d at 855.
97. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra.
99. If a body is found to be synonomous with the Commonwealth, the Biello
analysis will determine if its function is "governmental" and protected or "proprie-
tary" and not protected. Here "governmental" is a word of art. Furthermore, in
light of the statistics cited by Justice Nix's dissent in Biello, it seems unlikely that
any revenue raising activity of the Commonwealth can be found proprietary if the
LCB is governmental.
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (1969 & Supp. 1975).
101. Id. § 1-104(a) (1969).
102. Id. § 2-207(i).
103. id. § 8-802.
104. Id. § 744-910 (Supp. 1975). In Poklemba v. Shamokin State Gen. Hosp.,
financial operation is closely tied to the fiscal management of the
State. Most importantly, no provision in the Liquor Code denies the
responsibility of the Commonwealth for actions of -the LCB.
On the basis of this analysis and the supreme court's earlier
holding in Biello, the LCB's only vulnerability to suit appears to lie in
its extensive self-regulatory powers. The Specter decision, however,
clearly does not extend so far.'05 Had Specter held self-regulation by
a state agency sufficient to separate it from the Commonwealth, the
various departments existing within the Commonwealth, though fi-
nancially dependent upon the sovereign, would inevitably lose their
immune status.
IV. Conclusion
In Specter v. Commonwealth' °6 the supreme court analyzed the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission's right to invoke sovereign im-
munity from two interrelated perspectives. The first approach
viewed the nature and function of the PTC in a statutory context. The
second examined cases in which the PTC's status was at issue. At the
outset the court acknowledged that Rader v. PTC'1 7 constituted an
unmistakable pronouncement of the PTC's right to share in the im-
munity of the sovereign. Despite this strong precedent the Specter
court held that the PTC was not immune from tort actions and over-
ruled Rader.
Rader was more than the first statement by the supreme court
that the PTC enjoyed sovereign immunity. It was the first case in
which the court directly examined the posture of a major state
agency. The rationale of the Rader decision was applied by analogy
and found persuasive in cases challenging the status of similarly
situated bodies, among them the General State Authority,'"8 the
Delaware River Port Authority,'0 9 and the Liquor Control Board." 0
Specter necessitates, at the very least, a reassessment of the decisions
21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 301, 303, 344 A.2d 732, 733 (1975), the commonwealth
court declared a similar financial relationship between the State and an agency to
be proof of its lack of autonomy.
105. The Specter court early in its decision recognized that the capacity of the
PTC to regulate its internal affairs was inconsistent with its earlier characterization
as the Commonwealth's alter ego. This was not found, however, to be determinative
of the PTC's status. The characteristic that convinced the majority in Specter was
the Commission's complete financial independence from the Commonwealth. See
note 35 and accompanying text supra. In fact, the court's emphasis of this element
may have unnecessarily stultified normal extension of the Specter principles into
other areas. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
106. - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 481 (1975).
107. 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962).
108. E.g., Roney v. GSA, 413 Pa. 218, 196 A.2d 349 (1964).
109. E.g., Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962).




following Rader and probably requires denial of their continued
validity.
In Specter the court extended the dichotomy between "political
subdivisions or governmental entities other than the Common-
wealth""'1 and the Commonwealth and its agencies that it had recog-
nized in Ayala. Justice Pomeroy examined the PTC, a state agency
created by the Commonwealth to perform essential state functions,
and found it to be a separate and distinct governmental body not
entitled to share the Commonwealth's immunity. The element the
court pointed to as illustrative of the PTC's separation from the
Commonwealth was its ability to remain financially independent
through issuance of turnpike revenue bonds. By recognizing fiscal
autonomy as a determinant of the status of governmental agencies,
the supreme court has sharpened the Ayala test and curtailed the
extent of sovereign immunity.
Uncertainty remains in the wake of Specter. The case's signifi-
cance depends on how liberal a construction it receives in fu-
ture decisions. A strong argument can be advanced that Specter
leads inexorably to the abrogation of sovereign immunity in the
General State Authority,"' the Delaware River Port Authority,"'
and the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency." 4 The Liquor Con-
trol Board, because of its statutory structure," 5 its police functions," 6
and its unique nexus with the Commonwealth, is properly character-
ized as part of the Commonwealth and immune. 117 The validity of
this argument presupposes the courts' receptivity to the proposition
that a governmental entity's financial autonomy can be manifested in
forms other than that demonstrated by the PTC and found indicative
of independence from the Commonwealth in Specter. On the other
hand, a construction of Specter that strips sovereign immunity from
only those state agencies structurally identical to the PTC will emas-
culate the decision's effect and leave the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity largely untouched. The mood of the supreme court, as revealed in
111. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 482.
112. See notes 61-77 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 78-94 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 52-58 and accompanying text supra.
115. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
116. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
117. This mutual identity suggested between the LCB and the Commonwealth
is exactly the situation contemplated by the Specter court when it explained that al-
though the PTC is not immune, the Department of Highways is. See note 24 and
note 47 and accompanying text supra.
recent decisions on this topic," 8 and the potential effectiveness of
Specter in limiting the extent of the Commonwealth's immunity re-
quires a liberal stance in determining when an agency is financially
autonomous and, therefore, amenable to suit.
CHARLES L. O'BRIEN
118. The supreme court has grown weary of several forms of immunity. See
Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (govern-
mental immunity abolished); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971)
(parental immunity abolished); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208
A.2d 193 (1965) (charitable immunity abolished). In Specter Justice Pomeroy ex-
pressed the court's impatience with the general assembly's failure to modify the Com-
monwealth's immunity to allow meritorious suits. Specter v. Commonwealth, - Pa.
-, -, 341 A.2d 481, 482 (1975).
